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1. The invalidity of  Directive 2006/24: implications for the 
legal order of  Member States3 
Following the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, and in the context of  
European competence for the protection of  personal data [currently provided for 
in Article 16 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU)], 
the European Parliament and the Council have adopted the Directive 2006/24 (on 
the retention of  data generated or processed in connection with the provision of  
publicly available electronic communications services or of  public communications 
networks). This directive regulated the retention of  data by service providers in 
the exercise of  economic activities for the purpose of  investigating, detecting and 
prosecuting serious crime, irrespective of  any prior request by the Member States’ 
law enforcement officers or judiciary.4  
The data in question allows one to decipher with whom a user has communicated, 
by what means, the time of  communication, the place from which the communication 
takes place, and how often a user communicates with certain people during a certain 
period – information which is known by “metadata”.5 The directive was applicable 
to traffic data and location data, relating to both natural and legal persons, including 
information consulted using an electronic communications network – albeit it did 
not apply to the content of  the communication. Since then, Member States have 
been retaining the data for periods of  no less than six months and no more than 
two years from the date of  communication, so that they can be transmitted, upon 
request, to the competent authorities.
However, in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment of  2014, the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Union (CJEU) declared the Directive 2006/24 invalid. The heart 
of  the matter laid in the fact that the directive covered all those who used electronic 
communications services in Europe – even those whose data was not criminally 
relevant. In addition, the directive did not provide for any differentiation, limitation 
or exception in the light of  the objective of  combating serious crime and therefore, 
applied even to persons whose communications were subject to professional secrecy. 
Besides this general absence of  limits, the Directive 2006/24 did not lay down an 
objective criterion for delimiting the access of  the competent national authorities 
to the data and their subsequent use. Moreover, it did not require that the data in 
question should be kept within the territory of  the Union, and therefore, it could not 
be considered that supervision by an independent entity was fully guaranteed.
Ultimately, the directive obliged electronic communications service providers to 
retain data whose analysis makes it possible to “create a both faithful and exhaustive map of  
a large portion of  a person’s conduct strictly forming part of  his private life, or even a complete and 
3 For a detailed account of  this topic, see Alessandra Silveira and Pedro Freitas, “Implicações da 
declaração de invalidade da Diretiva 2006/24 na conservação de dados pessoais (“metadados”) nos 
Estados-Membros da UE: uma leitura jusfundamental”, Revista de Direito, Estado e Telecomunicações, 
Universidade de Brasília, vol. 9, nº. 1 (2017), http://www.ndsr.org/SEER/index.php?journal=rdet. 
4 The purpose of  the provisions of  the Directive 2006/24 was the harmonization of  national 
laws regarding the obligation to retain data (Article 3), categories of  data to be retained (Article 
5), periods of  retention (Article 6), data protection and data security (Article 7), as well as storage 
requirements for retained data (Article 8). 
5 Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera, “The political and judicial life of  metadata: Digital Rights 
Ireland and the trail of  the data retention directive”, CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe 65 
(2014): 1. 
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accurate picture of  his private identity”.6 A general obligation to retain data in these terms 
allows for serious individual interference by means of  targeted surveillance, but also 
mass interference which might be even more worrying. In other words, those that 
affect a substantial part or even the entire relevant population of  a Member State, 
such as the identification of  all individuals suffering from psychological disorders 
or of  all individuals who are opposed to a certain political regime. For example, 
individuals who have contacted a psychologist during the data retention period or all 
individuals on mailing lists who criticise a political regime government policy might 
be instantly identified.7
The CJEU was then called upon to assess the validity of  Directive 2006/24 in 
the light of  Articles 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection of  personal 
data) of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union (CFREU) and 
was of  the opinion that the obligation imposed by the Directive 2006/24 on the 
providers of  electronic communications services constituted an interference with 
those fundamental rights.8 To that end, it did not matter whether or not sensitive 
data was involved, or whether or not such interference caused inconvenience to the 
parties concerned.9 While it is true that the fight against serious crime is of  prime 
importance for ensuring public safety and that its effectiveness may depend on the 
use of  modern investigative techniques, such a general interest objective, however 
fundamental it may be, cannot, in itself, justify that a retention measure such as 
that introduced by the Directive 2006/24 should be considered necessary for the 
purposes of  that fight.10 
To this extent, the CJEU concluded that the Directive 2006/24 did not provide 
sufficient guarantees, as required by Article 8 of  the CFREU, to ensure effective 
protection of  the retained data against the risks of  abuse and against any unlawful 
access or use. In fact, the Directive 2006/24 did not lay down rules governing the 
extent of  interference with the fundamental rights of  data subjects in order to restrict 
it to what is strictly necessary. In adopting Directive 2006/24, the European Union’s 
legislator had exceeded the limits imposed by the principle of  proportionality in the 
light of  Articles 7, 8 and 52 (1) of  the CFREU – which is why the CJEU declared 
the invalidity of  the directive, without reservations as to the temporal effects of  its 
decision (efficacy ex tunc).
The decision of  the CJEU raised the problem of  the effects of  that invalidity 
in relation to the national provisions transposing the directive which have since, been 
declared invalid. Some scholars suggested that the impact of  the CJEU’s decision 
on national law was unclear – since the Court had not given any indications in this 
particular case – yet the primacy principle and the consequent conformity of  national 
rules with Union law should be complied with.11 Other scholars adopted a traditional 
stance according to which the declaration of  invalidity of  the directive would not 
6 See Opinion of  Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 12 December 2013, judgment Digital 
Rights Ireland, C-293/12, recital 74. 
7 See Opinion of  Advocate General Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered on 19 July 2016, 
judgment Tele2, joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, recitals 252 to 258.
8 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, April, 8, 2014, joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, recital 34. 
9 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, cit., recital 33. 
10 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, cit., recital 61. 
11 Franziska Boehm and Mark D. Cole, Data Retention after the Judgement of  the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union, 2014, p. 28 (https://www.janalbrecht.eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/Boehm_
Cole_-_Data_Retention_Study_-_June_2014.pdf). 
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directly imply the invalidity of  the national law that transposed it – insofar as the 
rules in question would come from different sources or separate legal systems –, 
although it would be necessary to evaluate the compliance of  the national rules with 
Union law following the decision of  the CJEU.12 
In view of  the difficulty of  the problem, it is not surprising that, following the 
judgment in Digital Rights Ireland, two national courts (one Swedish and one British) 
have referred questions for a preliminary ruling of  the CJEU in order to ultimately 
test the conformity of  national systems that still impose a general obligation of  
retention of  data on providers of  publicly available electronic communications 
services. This judgment was published in December 2016.13 In other words, by means 
of  the questions referred for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU was asked to specify 
the consequences of  the invalidity declared in Digital Rights Ireland for the national 
authorities and to determine whether a general obligation to retain data would be 
compatible with Article 15 (1) of  Directive 2002/58 (concerning the processing 
of  personal data and the protection of  privacy in the electronic communications 
sector), in the light of  Articles 7, 8 and 52 (1) of  the CFREU. The cited Article 15 
(1) of  the Directive 2002/58 authorises Member States to adopt legislative measures 
for the retention of  data for a limited period, subject to compliance with the general 
principles of  the Union law and fundamental rights protected therein.
Thus, by way of  preliminary ruling, the CJEU delivered the Tele2 judgment 
in 2016, from which it can be concluded that i) the declaration of  invalidity of  the 
provisions contained in a directive inevitably affects the legal act of  transposition of  
those provisions into the legal system of  the Member States and ii) a Member State 
cannot rely on the Directive 2002/58 to enforce a generalised and undifferentiated 
obligation to retain traffic and location data following the declaration of  invalidity of  
Directive 2006/24. It is therefore, urgent to draw conclusions from this recent ruling 
by the CJEU, which is all the more relevant because, in Member States where the 
transposed legislation continued to apply following the declaration of  invalidity of  
Directive 2006/24 – as was the case in Portugal – many criminal convictions relied 
upon a potentially illegitimate access to data.
2. From the Digital Rights judgment to the Tele2 judgment: 
implications for understanding the fundamental right to the 
protection of  personal data
Despite being a landmark in the CJEU’s case-law on the protection of  
fundamental rights – comparable, according to Steve Peers, to the classic judgments 
on civil rights of  the US Supreme Court14 – the Digital Rights Ireland judgment did 
not end the retention of  data in the context of  the Union,15 especially since the 
12 Clara Guerra and Filipa Calvão, “Anotação ao Acórdão do Tribunal de Justiça (Grande Secção) de 
8 de abril de 2014”, Forum de proteção de dados, Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados 1 (2015): 79. 
13 Judgment Tele2, December, 21, 2016, joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15. 
14 According to Steve Peers, “The data retention judgment: the CJEU prohibits mass surveillance”, 
EU law analysis, 8 April 2014: “Time will deal whether the Digital Rights judgment is seen as the EU’s 
equivalent of  classic civil rights judgments of  the US Supreme Court, on the desegregation of  schools (Brown) or 
criminal suspects’ rights (Miranda). If  the Charter ultimately contributes to the development of  a ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ in the European Union, this judgment will be one of  its foundations” (http://eulawanalysis.
blogspot.pt/2014/04/the-data-retention-judgment-cjeu.html). 
15 Niklas Vainio and Samuli Miettinen, “Telecommunications data retention after Digital Rights 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 3, No. 2, July 2017
49 Alessandra Silveira & Pedro Miguel Freitas 
CJEU considered that, while the retention of  data imposed by Directive 2006/24 
constituted a particularly serious interference with fundamental rights for the 
protection of  privacy and the protection of  personal data, it likely, did not affect the 
essential content of  such rights.
In accordance with Article 52 (1) of  the CFREU, any restriction on the exercise 
of  the rights and freedoms set out therein must be i) provided for by law, ii) respect 
the essential content of  those rights, iii) respect the principle of  proportionality, 
and iv) be necessary for the pursuit of  objectives of  general interest recognized 
by the Union or for the protection of  the rights and freedoms of  third parties. 
However, in view of  the fact that Article 1(2) of  Directive 2006/24 did not allow the 
content of  electronic communications to be known, the CJEU held that there was 
no compromise of  the core of  the right to privacy.
Furthermore, in the CJEU’s view, Article 7 of  Directive 2006/24 provided for 
compliance with the principles of  protection and security of  personal data, as long 
as Member States ensured that technical and organizational measures were taken 
against accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration of  data – 
and therefore the core of  the fundamental right to data protection would also be 
safeguarded.16 However, even if  the essential core was safeguarded, the legislation 
was disproportionate – this is the understanding of  the CJEU that was the basis for 
the declaration of  invalidity of  Directive 2006/24.
In our view, it is not clear from the case-law of  the European Court of  Human 
Rights (ECtHR) that the general and undifferentiated nature of  the retention of  
personal data by providers of  electronic communications services (mass surveillance) 
is in line with the core of  fundamental rights – especially because suspicion is not 
a necessary element for the justification of  data retention. Nor is it in conformity 
with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, namely when one 
takes into account the amount of  unconstitutionality rulings of  national rules issued 
by various constitutional courts of  the Member States following the declaration of  
invalidity of  Directive 2006/24 by the CJEU.17 
In the ECtHR’s judgment in the S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom’s case,18 for 
example, concerning the preservation of  genetic profiles (DNA) or fingerprints of  
any person acquitted of  the commission of  a crime or whose proceedings have 
been closed without conviction, the ECtHR held that the retention of  such data was 
contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), irrespective of  the 
consideration of  safeguards.19 Furthermore, in the case of  Roman Zakharov v. Russia,20 
which concerned the Russian system of  interception of  telephone communications, 
the ECtHR ruled that the automatic retention of  irrelevant data for six months was 
not justified in the light of  Article 8 of  the ECHR (right to respect for private and 
Ireland : legislative and judicial reactions in the Member States”, International Journal of  Law and 
Information Technology, v. 23, n. 3 (2015): 308. 
16 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, cit., recital 38 to 40. 
17 On this theme, see Matthew White, “The new Opinion on data retention: does it protect the right 
to privacy?”, EU law analysis,  27 July 2016 (http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.pt/2016/07/the-new-
opinion-on-data-retention-does.html). 
18 Judgment S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, 4 December 2008, cases 30562/04 and 30566/04, recital 
125. 
19 See Matthew White, “The new Opinion on data retention…”, cit. 
20 Judgment Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 4 December 2015, case 47143/06, recital 255. 
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family life).21 
In his Opinion in Tele2, the Advocate General took the same approach to the 
Digital Rights Ireland’s ruling on the question of  the inviolability of  the central core 
of  fundamental rights.22 However, the Advocate-General is manifestly contradicting 
himself  when he points out that “the risks associated with access to communications data 
(or ‘metadata’) may be as great or even greater than those arising from access to the content of  
communications, as has been pointed out by Open Rights Group, Privacy International and the 
Law Society of  England and Wales, as well as in a recent report by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights”. In particular, the Advocate General adds, ‘’‘metadata’ 
facilitate the almost instantaneous cataloguing of  entire populations, something which the content of  
communications does not”.23
The Advocate General concludes that there is nothing theoretical about the 
risks of  abusive or illegal access to retained data, as the risk must be linked to 
the extremely large number of  requests for access referred to in the observations 
submitted to the CJEU.24 Under Swedish law, Tele2 indicated that it received about 
10,000 requests for access per month, a number that does not include requests 
received by other providers active in Sweden. With regard to the United Kingdom, 
excerpts from an official report mentioned 517,236 authorisations and 55,346 urgent 
oral authorisations were reproduced in 2014. In addition, the Advocate General 
acknowledges “the risk of  illegal access, on the part of  any person, is as substantial as the 
existence of  computerised databases is extensive”.25 But if  the justification for not affecting 
the essential core of  the right to data protection lies mainly in the measures against 
accidental or unlawful destruction, accidental loss or alteration of  the data, how is 
that compatible with the remarks above?
It is not hard to discern that the Advocate General avoids admitting that the 
general and undifferentiated retention of  personal data is, per se, incompatible with 
the fundamental rights protected in the CFREU. He, therefore, concentrates on the 
safeguards which must go with a general obligation of  retention of  data in order to 
be compatible with the fundamental rights provided for by Union law – and not in 
what the Member States would be prohibited from doing in this field.26 Regrettably, 
this kind of  “headlong rush” is beginning to be usual in the handling of  the matter 
– and it had also guided, in Judge Paulo Pinto Albuquerque’s opinion, the decision-
making of  the ECtHR in Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, on mass surveillance for reasons 
of  intelligence and national security.27 
21 Commentating the decision of  the ECtHR Roman Zakharov v. Russia, cit., the Advocate General 
underlined, in his Opinion in Tele 2, cit., recital 243, that national regimes must lay down an 
obligation to destroy definitively any retained data once it is no longer strictly necessary in the fight 
against serious crime. He added that this obligation must be observed not only by service providers 
that retain data, but also by the authorities that have accessed the retained data. 
22 Opinion on Tele2, cit., recital 156-159. 
23 Opinion on Tele2, cit., recital 259. 
24 Opinion on Tele2, cit., recital 260. 
25 Idem. 
26 See Matthew White, “The new Opinion on data retention…”, cit. 
27 Judgment Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, 12 January 2016, Application No. 37138/14, especially 
the recital 20 of  the concurring opinion, in which Paulo Pinto Albuquerque denounces what he 
considers “an illusory conviction that global surveillance is the deus ex machina capable of  combating the scourge 
of  global terrorism. Even worse, such delusory language obliterates the fact that the vitrification of  society brings 
with it the Orwellian nightmare of  1984. In practice, the Chamber is condoning, to use the words of  the European 
Parliament, ‘the establishment of  a fully-fledged preventive state, changing the established paradigm of  criminal law 
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In any case, among the contradictions of  the Advocate General in Tele2, perhaps 
the most perplexing would be the analysis of  proportionality, stricto sensu of  a general 
data retention obligation. This dimension was not considered by the CJEU in the 
Digital Rights Ireland’s case because the Court held that the regime established by 
Directive 2006/24 exceeded what was necessary for the purpose of  combating serious 
crime. According to the Advocate General, the requirement of  proportionality stricto 
sensu arises both, from Article 15 (1) of  Directive 2002/58, from Article 52 (1) of  
the CFREU and from settled case-law of  the CJEU – and implies that a restriction 
of  fundamental rights is to be regarded as proportionate only if  the disadvantages 
caused by it are not disproportionate to the objectives pursued.
Thus, the requirement of  proportionality stricto sensu imposes a balance between 
the advantages conferred by the measure in the light of  the legitimate aim pursued 
(on the one hand) and the disadvantages which result from that measure to the 
fundamental rights enshrined in a democratic society (on the other). In other words, 
it imposes a balance between the advantages and disadvantages of  a general data 
retention obligation applied to all European users without having a requisite of  
suspicion of  serious crime – which would ultimately lead to a debate on the prevailing 
values and the kind of  society in which we want to live.28 
So, what was the solution proposed by the Advocate General, which was to 
be to the detriment of  the homogeneity of  European Union law? That such an 
evaluative assessment be returned to the national judge in the light of  the mandatory 
safeguards laid down by the CJEU in Recitals 60 to 68 of  the judgment in Digital 
Rights Ireland.29 However, the CJEU did not accept the Opinion of  the Advocate 
General and, in Tele 2, took strict proportionality as a basis in order to decide that 
the CFREU precludes national legislation from laying down, with the purpose of  
fighting serious crime, the widespread and undifferentiated retention of  all traffic 
and location data of  all registered users for all electronic means of  communication.30 
Thus, in answering in in more detail to the questions raised by the national 
courts in preliminary rulings, the CJEU ruled that Article 15 (1) of  Directive 2002/58, 
in the light of  Articles 7, 8, 11 And 52 (1) of  the CFREU, must be interpreted as 
impeding national legislation governing the protection of  traffic and location data, 
in particular the access of  national authorities to the data retained i) without limiting 
such access to cases of  serious crime and ii) without making such access subject to 
prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, and; iii) without 
requiring that the data concerned to be kept within the territory of  the Union.31
3. The Tele2 judgment and the Portuguese legal system: is 
there anything new?
To better understand the stance of  the CJEU and its implications for Portuguese 
in democratic societies whereby any interference with suspects’ fundamental rights has to be authorised by a judge or 
prosecutor on the basis of  a reasonable suspicion and must be regulated by law, promoting instead a mix of  law-
enforcement and intelligence activities with blurred and weakened legal safeguards, often not in line with democratic 
checks and balances and fundamental rights, especially the presumption of  innocence’”. 
28 Opinion on Tele2, cit., recital 246-248. 
29 Opinion on Tele2, cit., recital 262. 
30 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 112. 
31 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 125. 
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national law, in particular as regards its material compatibility with European Union 
law, it is necessary to analyze some of  the Recitals set out in the judgment.
The CJEU has not, from the outset, altered its position on the absence of  a 
breach of  the essential core of  the fundamental rights at issue,32 although it has 
acknowledged that we are still dealing with a wide and particularly serious interference 
with Articles 7 and 8 of  the CFREU, in the sense that the retention of  traffic and 
location data might convey to people a feeling of  constant surveillance.33 It also 
acknowledged that the retention of  traffic and location data could influence the 
use of  electronic means of  communication and, therefore, the exercise of  freedom 
of  expression by users of  such means, guaranteed by Article 11 of  the CFREU.34 
For this reason, it is not surprising that the CJEU sees in this interference, a kind 
of  exceptional instrument vis-à-vis the principles laid down in Directive 2002/58, 
namely the principle of  confidentiality.
The CJEU also states that national rules which retain traffic and location data, 
affecting all persons using electronic communications, without any limitation or 
exception, including the existence of  prior evidence that links, albeit indirectly, a 
particular person to a crime cannot be considered justified in a democratic society.35 
There should be limits to data retention and a relationship between the data 
retained and a threat to public safety should be demanded. Such limits may include, 
for example, the retention of  data pertaining to a particular time period and/or 
geographical area and/or a group of  persons likely to be involved, in one way or 
another, in a serious crime (or persons who could contribute, through their data 
being retained, to fighting crime).36 
Can it be avowed that the Law No. 32/2008 of  17 July, which transposes Directive 
2006/24 into the Portuguese national legal order, fulfills these requirements? Perhaps 
we could put forward the argument of  the temporal limitation of  the retention of  
traffic and location data. In fact, Article 6 of  the aforementioned law limits to one 
year the period of  retention of  traffic and location data, counting from the date of  
completion of  the communication. But this argument can be easily nullified. On the 
one hand, if  we consider Recitals 59 and 64 et seq. of  the judgment in Digital Rights 
Ireland, the CJEU had sustained the need for the existence of  abovementioned limits 
and, in its view, those were not ensured even though Directive 2006/24, in Article 6, 
established a period of  retention of  data between six months and two years from the 
date of  communication. It is, therefore, fairly evident that when the CJEU refers to 
the lack of  temporal periods of  data retention in Directive 2006/24, this might not 
contradict Article 6, as we are dealing with different dimensions of  the problem. One 
thing is to know whether, in the case of  data retention, what the period of  retention 
should be. In this regard, the CJEU was clear in stating that the directive did not 
provide for objective criteria, in particular, depending on the type of  data, in order to 
assess compliance with the principle of  proportionality. A completely different thing 
is to demand that the data retention occurs only in a given time period. To reinforce 
this idea is the fact that, at the origin of  Tele 2, inter alia, the question of  a general 
obligation of  data for only six months. A shorter time period, therefore, than that 
32 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 101. 
33 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 100. 
34 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 101. 
35 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 105. 
36 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 106. 
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provided for in Law 32/2008, but which did not prevent the CJEU from asserting its 
incompatibility with Article 15 of  Directive 2002/58.
The key expression in this judgment, potentially fatal to Law No. 32/2008 in its 
current formulation, is “targeted retention”. Law No. 32/2008 enforces the retention 
and transmission of  traffic, location and related data of  all natural and legal persons, 
without any limit or exception: the data subject has no possibility of  opposition to 
its retention and transmission [Article 3 (4)], and there are no limits on “categories of  
data to be retained, the means of  communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention 
period adopted”.37 In this respect, the CJEU is particularly clear about its objection 
to widespread “surveillance”, thus requiring data retention, in particular, for the 
prevention of  serious crime, to comply with what is strictly necessary.
Strictly necessary means for the CJEU that the Member States must lay down the 
introduction of  clear and precise rules which contain i) objective criteria establishing 
a connection between the data to be retained and the objective pursued and ii) limit 
the extent of  interference with fundamental rights. This second requirement implies, 
first, a restriction on the public affected by the retention measure, according to 
objective criteria, which may, for example, consist of  “geographical criterion where the 
competent national authorities consider, on the basis of  objective evidence, that there exists, in one or 
more geographical areas, a high risk of  preparation for or commission of  such offences”.38 
In short, “Article 15(1) of  Directive 2002/58, read in the light of  Articles 7, 8 and 
11 and Article 52(1) of  the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which, 
for the purpose of  fighting crime, provides for the general and indiscriminate retention of  all 
traffic and location data of  all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of  electronic 
communication”.39 In other words, if  it were to be data retention consistent with Article 
15 (1) of  Directive 2002/58, it should be targeted and limited with respect to the 
categories of  data to be retained, the means of  communication affected, the persons 
concerned and the retention period adopted.40 
With this in mind, the legal-material incompatibility of  Law No. 32/2008 with 
European Union law is evident. Following the Digital Rights Ireland’s case, the reaction 
of  the Member States was not consensual, which led to an unlawful differentiation 
of  treatment between European citizens. According to the Portuguese Public 
Prosecutor’s Office,41 ten of  the Member States of  the European Union declared 
that national laws transposing the data retention directive were invalid, either by 
parliamentary decision or by their constitutional courts. In the other Member 
States, including Portugal, this was not the case because it was understood that the 
requirements of  the CJEU’s decision were previously met.42 
According to Practical Note No. 7 of  the Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, the common understanding, peacefully shared by the judicial community and 
the Portuguese telecommunications operators, is that Law No. 32/2008 was in force 
and valid. Allegedly because, in addition to the transposition of  Directive 2006/24, 
37 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 108. 
38 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 111. 
39 Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 112.  
40 These are cumulative requisites. See Judgment Tele2, cit., recital 108 
41 Gabinete Cibercrime do Ministério Público. Nota Prática n.º 7 sobre retenção de dados de tráfego 
e Lei n.º 32/2008, 2015 (http://cibercrime.ministeriopublico.pt/sites/default/files/documentos/
pdf/nota_pratica_7_retencao_de_dados.pdf).  
42 Niklas Vainio and Samuli Miettinen, “Telecommunications data retention after Digital Rights 
Ireland…”, cit., p. 301 ff. 
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that law introduced a broader regulatory framework for the data retention process 
(for example, among other things, the rules that should be observed on retention of  
data, persons empowered to access data or the conditions of  storage and access to 
data). Therefore, in the opinion of  the Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s Office, the 
national law had gone far beyond the requirements of  the Directive and most of  
the requirements that came to be made by the CJEU ruling would already have been 
previously considered in domestic law.43 
Yet the competence to correct errors and to regulate the matter in accordance 
with the judgment of  the CJEU is not of  the Portuguese legislator – it is of  the 
European legislator.44 That is precisely so, in order to avoid the schizophrenic result 
whereby, in the context of  European competence, citizens of  another Member 
State other than Portugal, who are not suspects of  a crime, are no longer subject 
to the retention of  their personal data after the Digital Rights Ireland’s judgement, 
and the Portuguese still are. This undermines the effectiveness of  European Union 
law, undermines the uniformity of  its application in the different Member States 
and leads to unjustified differences of  treatment between European citizens in the 
protection of  their fundamental rights.
The disparity between the Member States following the declaration of  
invalidity of  Directive 2006/24 suggests that there are serious divergences between 
the applicable European Union law – which is incompatible with the idea of  an 
Union based on the rule of  law. In this context, if  the Portuguese courts had doubts 
as to the continued application of  Law No. 32/2008, a dialogue with the CJEU 
was required by way of  preliminary ruling in order to; i) disclose the scope or 
consequences of  declared invalidity and; ii) to exclude the risk of  misinterpretation 
or breach of  European Union law.45 At the very least, the proceedings should have 
been suspended on the ground that the CJEU was dealing with two references for a 
preliminary ruling on the subject46 – for which the Portuguese authorities could not 
plead lack of  knowledge because, under Article 21(4) of  the Rules of  Procedure Of  
the Court of  Justice, a notice is published in the Official Journal of  the European 
Union giving an account of  the questions referred to the Court and the Portuguese 
State is notified for the submission of  written statements or observations under 
Article 96 (1) (b) of  the Rules.
However, contrary to the CJEU’s decision, the Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s 
Office’s Practical Note No. 7 states that the Court’s decision imposes “conditions that 
are not viable or that, if  applicable, render the retention useless.” In this sense, it is defended 
that data retention, as understood in the framework of  Directive 2006/24 and Law 
No. 32/2008, is only useful if  the data refers to all citizens in an indiscriminate 
43 For an analysis of  the contradictions between the Law No. 32/2008 and the European Union law, 
see Clara Guerra and Filipa Calvão, “Anotação acórdão do Tribunal de Justiça (Grande Secção) de 8 
de abril de 2014”, cit., p. 81-82. 
44 See Outcome of  the 3528th Council meeting (Justice and Home Affairs), Brussels, 27 and 28 March 
2017, Council of  the European Union  (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2017/03/
st07688_en17_pdf): “The presidency informed ministers on the ongoing work towards facilitating a common reflection 
process at EU level in light of  recent European court of  justice case-law. The presidency intends to work in a specific 
working group format to hold discussions on the requirements of  the relevant judgements, to exchange best practices and 
to analyse what is needed for the purposes of  criminal proceedings related to the availability of  certain types of  data. The 
reflection process in the Council will also allow for synergies with the work undertaken by the Commission to provide 
guidance on bringing national data retention laws into line with the Tele 2 Judgment.”
45 Judgment Ferreira da Silva, 9 September 2015, C-160/14, recital 44. 
46 Joined cases C-203/15 and C-698/15. 
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manner, as “at the time when the data is retained and preserved, it is not possible to know whether 
such data may be necessary as evidence of  a crime. Only after a crime has occurred will the data, 
however, retained in a generalised and indiscriminate manner assume probative value”.
However, it is clear from the judgment in Digital Rights Ireland that the Portuguese 
Government, in its written observations to the CJEU, considered that the effectiveness 
of  the regime for the collection of  traffic and location data imposed by Directive 
2006/24 was to some extent limited, in particular, in relation to organized crime and 
terrorism, due to the existence of  several methods of  electronic communication 
which do not fall within the scope of  Directive 2006/24 or which allow anonymous 
communication and thus, circumvent state surveillance. This limits the ability of  
the data retention measure to attain the objective pursued.47 If  that is the case, why 
should we subject Portuguese citizens who are not suspects of  committing a crime to 
a permanent and indiscriminate surveillance? How can we justify creating the feeling 
that their private life is being constantly monitored?48 
These doubts were certainly amplified by Tele2. Even if  we recognize the 
importance and usefulness of  the retention of  traffic data for the objective of  
identifying the alleged perpetrator of  a particular crime, which presupposes, in the 
words of  Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s Office’s, a retention of  data that is generalised 
and indiscriminate, one cannot simply choose to continue to disregard the European 
Union law, as if  it were a strange and foreign corpus in face of  the Portuguese national 
law. It is of  particular gravity that the Portuguese legal community remains relatively 
oblivious to this problem, in a matter as sensitive as this, of  infringement49 of  what 
is established not only in the decisions Digital Rights and Tele2, but especially in view 
of  the fundamental rights enshrined in the CFREU.
We have no doubts that Law No. 32/2008 was, in certain elements, a step 
forward in the protection of  citizens’ fundamental rights, for example, the conditions 
for access to data in Portugal are particularly demanding, since there is a prior judicial 
control;50 the obligation to destroy data at the end of  the retention period or retention 
order of  the court [Article 7 (1) (e) and (f)];51 the attention given to the protection of  
professional secrecy.52 
However, it cannot be concluded without further ado that the Portuguese law 
went beyond the requirements of  the directive. Among the normative complexity 
of  the Portuguese law, we find solutions, such as those mentioned above, which 
47 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, cit., recital 50. 
48 Judgment Digital Rights Ireland, cit., recital 37. 
49 Upheld in the Practical Note No. 7 of  the Portuguese Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
50 The CJEU also analysed this question in the Tele2’s judgment, asserting that “Article 15(1) of  
Directive 2002/58, as amended by Directive 2009/136, read in the light of  Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 
52(1) of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation governing the 
protection and security of  traffic and location data and, in particular, access of  the competent national authorities to 
the retained data, where the objective pursued by that access, in the context of  fighting crime, is not restricted solely to 
fighting serious crime, where access is not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority, 
and where there is no requirement that the data concerned should be retained within the European Union”. 
51 On this possibility, retaining data beyond the one year period established by Article 6, the Practical 
Note No. 7 does not address. In fact, according to Article 7 (1) (e) and (f), the destruction of  the 
retained data might not occur as soon as the retention period ends. If  the court considers the data 
relevant for the investigation it can order its preservation, as long as it is strictly necessary, until 
one of  the following happens: an accusation is not filled; acquittal of  the accused; prescription of  
criminal procedure; or amnesty [Article 11 (1) (2)]. 
52 See Article 9 (4). 
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undoubtedly respect the fundamental rights protected by the European legal order. But 
it is also clear that since the Digital Rights’ case, other measures, such as widespread and 
undifferentiated retention, have fallen short of  the CJEU’s understanding of  what is 
strictly necessary, even if  Portuguese law only allows the transmission of  data relating 
to a suspect or accused person, intermediary or to the consenting victim of  a crime.53 
Transmission of  data only happens if  there was a previous retention of  data, which is 
enforced by fines ranging from EUR 1500 to EUR 50 000 or from EUR 5000 to EUR 
10 000 000 depending on whether the agent is a natural or legal person.54
All that remains for us is, as a legal community that is part of  the European 
Union’s corpus iuris, to reflect and draw urgent conclusions from the path established 
by the CJEU.
53 See Article 9 (3). 
54 Following the Deliberation No. 641/2017 of  9th May 2017, where it recommend an amendment 
to the Law No. 32/2008 due to the violation of  article No. 52 of  the CFREU and article No. 
18(2) of  the Portuguese Constitution, the CNPD (the Portuguese National Commission for the 
Protection of  Data) took a step further with the Deliberation 1008/2007 of  18th July 2017. Taking 
into account the Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Tele2 judgements as well as the Deliberation 641/2017, 
the CNPD stated that it would not appreciate any complaints resulting from the violation of  the 
Law No. 32/2008. In practical terms, considering that the CNPD holds the power of  investigation 
and punishment of  administrative offenses arising from the violation of  legal norms of  this legal 
instrument, this means that the providers of  publicly available electronic communications services 
or of  a public communications network will no longer be liable for not retaining traffic data, 
location data or related data necessary to identify the subscriber or user. 
